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Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
On April 23, 1976, Detective David Isom of the Little Rock,
Arkansas Police Department, Narcotics Squad, was informed by an
anonymous source that Lonnie James Sanders would be arriving on a
flight from Dallas, Texas, and would be carrying a green suitcase containing a large quantity of marijuana. 1 In response to this tip, Detective Isom, accompanied by two fellow officers, placed the airport
under surveillance. 2 As predicted, Sanders appeared carrying two
small pieces of hand luggage which he placed into the trunk of a taxi
cab. 3 Returning to the baggage claim area, he approached and spoke
briefly with another man who was later identified by police as David
Rambo. 4 After retrieving a green suitcase from the baggage area,
Sanders handed it to Rambo. 5 Sanders immediately moved outside
the airport and entered the cab into which he had previously placed
his other belongings. 6 Shortly thereafter, Rambo exited the terminal
placing the green suitcase in the trunk of the cab and joining respondent in the back seat. 7
As the taxi drove away, it was pursued by Detective Isom and a
fellow officer in their unmarked police vehicle.8 Within several
blocks of the airport, the cab was overtaken and ordered to pull to
the side of the road. 9 The police requested the taxi cab operator to
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979). The reliability of this particular informant
had been established by the Little Rock Police Department. Information which he had supplied
to them several months prior to this incident had led to the arrest and eventual conviction for
possession of marijuana of the respondent involved herein. Id.
2 Id.
3 1d. The respondent had had previous contacts with the Little Rock Police Department
and was therefore easily identifiable. Id.
4 1(1
5 Id.
6

Id.

7 Id. At the trial, David Rambo claimed that he had never met the respondent prior to the
date of the incident. He stated that he had first encountered him that day at the Dallas-Fort
Worth Airport, where Sanders allegedly approached him and offered him five dollars to carry
his luggage to the car after arriving in Little Rock. Trial Record at 150-51, Sanders v. State, 262
Ark. 595, 559 S.V.2d 704 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Trial record].
Respondent, when called to the stand to testify in his own behalf, rendered a completely
contradictory account regarding his prior association with Rambo. He claimed to be Raijibo's
cousin and to have known him previously. He additionally alleged that the green suitcase belonged to Rambo and denied ever picking it up and handing it to him. Id. at 162-66.
s Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979).
9 Id.
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open the trunk. 10 In the absence of either a search warrant or the
consent of Rambo or respondent, the officers opened the unlocked
green suitcase and found 9.3 pounds of marijuana. 11
Sanders and Ramnbo were then placed under arrest and transported to the police department in separate patrol units. 12 Both
men were charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver
in violation of state law.

13

In response to Sander's motion to sup-

press the evidence obtained from the suitcase, the trial court conducted a special hearing and denied this motion without explanation. 14 Sanders was subsequently tried by a jury and found guilty as
charged. 15 In accordance with the jury's suggestion, Sanders was
sentenced to serve a term of ten years in a state penitentiary and was

assessed a fifteen thousand dollar fine. 16
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in a unanimous decision, found the search conducted by the Little Rock police to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and accordingly, reversed the judgment of the trial court. 17
10 Id. One of the officers directed Rambo and the respondent to get out of the cab. Petition
for Certiorari at 3, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Petition for
Certiorari]. They were both subjected to a pat-down body search for weapons. Trial Record.
supra note 7, at 34, 96.
" Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979).
12 Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 598, 559 S.W.2d 704, 705 (1977). aff'd, 442 U.S. 753
(1979). A factual dispute arose as to when the arrest actually occurred. See Brief for Respondent
at 2, Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 559 S.W.2d 704 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Respondent]. Detective Isom, when called as a witness for the State, testified that the defendants had been placed under arrest at the moment the taxi was stopped. Id.. Trial Record, supra
note 7, at 27. The other officer, however, while undergoing direct examination conducted by
the State, claimed that the parties were not under arrest at the time the suitcase was searched.
Trial Record, supra note 7, at 49. For a further discussion of the significance of the timing of
the arrest, see notes 30-33 & 54 infra.
13 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979).
14 Id. at 756.
1- Petition for Certiorari, supra note 10, at 4; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 756
(1979).
16 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 756 (1979). The same jury found Sanders' codefeidant, David Rambo, guilty as charged. A lesser penalty, however, was imposed. Trial Record,
supra note 7, at 188-89. No express reason for the disparity in treatment was mentioned. Id.
17 Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 599-601, 559 S.W.2d 704, 706-07 (1977), aff d, 442 U.S.
753 (1979). The court recognized as a general rule that searches which are conducted without a
warrant are per se unreasonable under the fotirth amendment unless they fall within one of the
well recognized and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 599, 559
S.W.2d at 706. Relying upon the earlier United States Supreme Court cases of United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971), the court
found that in order to be constitutionally permissible, a warrantless search of an automobile
must be based upon the combined existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 262
Ark. at 599, 559 S.W.2d at 706. The probable cause requirement was held to have been satisfied on the basis of the detailed information supplied by the anonymous informant. The search
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The government's petition for a rehearing was denied by the state
supreme court which entered its judgment on January 23, 1978.18
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, and
in Arkansas v. Sanders, 19 the Court, in a seven to two decision, affirmed the judgment of the Arkansas supreme court. The Court limited its analysis to the issue of whether the automobile exception to
the fourth amendment warrant requirement could be extended to encompass the warrantless search of closed personal luggage found

within the car. 20
The fourth amendment requires that all searches and seizures
conducted by government agents be reasonable. 21 The general rule
appeared to be that searches conducted without a warrant were per
se unreasonable and, therefore, constitutionally invalid. 22 However,
as the law of search and seizure evolved, courts began to recognize
that the exigencies of certain situations made it impracticable for law
was ultimately found to be fatally defective, however, because of the total lack of exigent circumstances which would normally justify the failure to secure a warrant for the search of the
luggage. (d.at 601-02, 559 S.W.2d at 706-07. Because the car, its occupants, and the luggage
itself were within the control of the police, there was no danger that the suitcase or its contents
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could issue. Id.
Indeed, there is nothing in this set of circumstances that would lend credence to an
assertion of impracticality in obtaining a search warrant, or support the State's contention that "mobility of the object to be searched (the green suitcase)" justified a
warrantless search.
Id. at 600, 559 S.W.2d at 706.
is Petition for Certiorari, supra note 10, at 1-2.
19 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
20 Id. at 766. The Court explained that certiorari was granted to resolve "some apparent
misunderstanding as to the application of ... [its] decision in United States v. Chadwick . . . to
warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles." Id. at 754 (citation omitted).
21 The amendment provides in part, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), held
that the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.
In order to preserve and protect the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the second branch of the fourth amendment requires that all searches
carried out under color of governmental power be authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Case law has required that such warrants be issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate. E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
For a thorough review of the background and development of the fourth amendment, see
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (4th ed. 1970). See also Stengle, The Background of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Part One, III U. RICH. L. REv. 278
(1968): Stengle, The Background of the Fourth Ainerdient to the Constitution of the United
States, Part Two, IV U. RICH. L. REv. 60 (1969).
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 486-87 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1958).
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enforcement officials to secure warrants prior to carrying out an intended search. 23 In response to this realization, several 'jealously
and carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant re(u irement became
ingrained in fourth amendment jurisprudence. 24
None of these departures from the protections of the fourth
amendment has had a more pervasive effect upon the law of criminal
procedure than the automobile exception which was first recognized
in 1925. In Carroll v. United States, 25 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that so long as law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime was contained therein, the warrantless search of an entire automobile was
permissible. 26 The basis of the Court's decision was the apparent
distinction between stationary structures and movable vehicles. 2 7 The
impracticality of requiring the procurement of a warrant prior to the
search of a fleeting object justified the warrantless search of those
instrumentalities. 28
\Vhile Carroll was frequently relied upon in the enforcement of
prohibition laws, 29 it did not have a great impact on other areas of
the law since warrantless searches of automobiles were more often

23 See E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,

A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 9

(1975). It was eventually recognized that warrantless searches and reasonable searches were not
necessarily mutually exclusive. The reasonableness of a search was dependent upon the particular facts of each case. E.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156 (1947). Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
24 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Included among these exceptions were:
(1)search incident to lawful arrests, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969),
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1950). (2) exigent circumstances, e.g.,
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948), Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14-15 (1948); (3) consent, e.g.,Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); (4) hot
pursuit, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); and (5) automobile search. For a
discussion of the fifth exception, see notes 25-39 infra and accompanying text. For a thorough
survey and analysis of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement see 2 W. LAFA\VE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978).
25 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
26 Id. at 149. In Carroll, federal prohibition agents searched the automobile of two known
"bootleggers" and discovered sixty-eight bottles of alcoholic beverage concealed behind the upholstery of the seats. Id. at 135-36. Since the search of the automobile could not be justified as
incident to a lawful arrest, the defendants argued that the warrantless search and subsequent
seizure were violative of the fourth amendment. Id. at 156-58. The Court, however, determined
that the validity of the search need not be dependant upon the validity of the arrest. Id. at 158.
27 Id. at 153.
28 Id.
29 E.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164-65, 171, 178 (1949); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251, 254-55 (1938); Hust,

v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931).
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justified as being incident to the lawful arrest of the drivers and occupants of the vehicles. 30 The Supreme Court, however, in Chimel
v. California,31 severely restricted the usefulness of this justification
for a warrantless search. The Court limited the scope of the search to
that area within the arrestee's immediate control--the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." 32 Since this limitation was not applicable to the Carrollprobable cause search, that exception became the predominant justification for warrantless searches of motor vehicles. 3

Once the driver of an automobile is arrested and his vehicle
safely secured, the attribute of mobility which lies at the very heart of
the Carroll exception is seemingly no longer present. The issue,
therefore, arose as to whether the automobile exception could be
used to justify a warrantless search under such circumstances. In
Chambers v. Alaroney, 3 4 the Supreme Court expanded the parameters of the Carroll-probablecause exception to permit such a

search.35
30

The Court dismissed the argument that the police should

Utilization of this exception to the warrant requirement was less troublesome than

employment of the automobile search authorized by Carroll, given the narrow requirements
established in that case. Additionally, it was believed that the entire vehicle was subject to a
search incident to a valid arrest.
Although police officers were given wide latitude with respect to the area within which
they were permitted to search, the place and time of the search could not be too remote from
the place and time of the arrest. Such remoteness would preclude the search from being justified as incident to a law%,ful arrest. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68
(1964). See also Dvke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968).
31 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
32 Id, at 763.
For a discussion of the impact that Chimnel had upon warrantless searches of vehicles incident to the driver's arrest, see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 24, at 498-508.
33 V. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 11.1(a) (2d ed. 1979).
Subsequent to Chiniel, automobile searches have not been justified as being incident to a lawful
arrest except in those rare cases where, at the time of a suspect's arrest, probable cause to
search his vehicle did not exist. Id.
34 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
3- Id. at 52. In Chambers, the defendants were arrested shortly after being identified as
participants in the robbery of a local service station. Id. at 44. The car in which they had been
driving was removed to the police station where it was subsequently searched without a warrant. Id. The search revealed two .38 caliber revolvers along with other incriminating evidence.
1d. The defendants were indicted and ultimately convicted for the commission of the holdup.
Id. at 45.
The Court found that the probable cause requirement of the exception had been satisfied.
Id. at 47-48. The police, having received a detailed description of the suspects and their vehicle, had reasonable cause to believe that the car might contain the weapons used to perpetrate
the crime or the fruits thereof. Id. The existence of this probable cause would have justified an
immediate search of the vehicle. Id. at 52. However, the officers chose to remove the car to the
police station and search it there. Id. at 44. The Court found that both the probable cause factor
and the mobility of the vehicle, although in police custody, still existed at the station. Id. at 52.
The presence of these factors excused the absence of a warrant and validated the search. Id.
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search a vehicle immediately after stopping it, or alternatively, seize
and detain the car until a warrant is procured. 36 It was held that
neither of these methods could be characterized as a "greater or lesser intrusion" upon fourth amendment rights. 37
Two years following the Chambers decision, the expansion of the
automobile exception was somewhat curtailed in Coolidge u. New
Hampshire.3 8 There, the Court recognized that "It]he word 'au36 Id.

at 51-52. The Court stated that -[g]iven probable cause to search, either course is

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 1d. at 52.
31 Id. at 51-52.
The fourth amendment rights that are threatened in this type of situation are (1) an interest
in the secrecy of the car's contents and (2) an interest in maintaining control over one's propertv. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REN. 835, 840-41
(1974). It is the seizure of the vehicle which impinges upon the possessory interest in the
property, and it is the search which violates the interest in maintaining the secrecy of the car's
contents. Id. The Court in Chambers refused to hold that one of these interests was more
deserving of fourth amendment protection than the other. As between the immediate search
and the indefinite immobilization of the car, it was argued that the latter was the less offensive
intrusion on constitutional rights due to the preference for having a neutral and detached magistrate determine whether probable cause existed. 399 U.S. at 51. It was ultimately held, however, that the question of "which is the 'greater' and which the 'lesser' intrusion is itself a
debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances." Id. at 51-52.
In dissent, Justice Harlan made clear his belief that an immediate warrantless search "involve[d] the greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values." Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). For those persons who are more greatly inconvenienced and offeided by the delay involved in waiting until a warrant can be obtained, consent always remains
a viable alternative. Id. at 64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The privacy
interest in the contents of one's automobile was therefore viewed as a more significant fourth
amendment right than the interest in maintaining control over one's own property.
Justice Harlan's view that the right to maintain the secrec' of the contents of one's automobile was deserving of the same fourth amendment protections as an'. other privacy interest
was never accepted by the Court. In fact, this notion was later expressly rejected in an o pinion
which found that the automobile was a form of property in which individuals enjoyed a reduced
expectation of privacy. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). Motor vehicles were instrumentalities that had been designed solely for transportation: they were never intended to
serve as "one's residence or as the repository of personal effects." Id. Along with the inherent
mobility of the vehicle, the diminished expectation of privacy' which surrounds it became the
second half of the rationale justifying the "'automobile exception." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
at 761. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
38 403 U.S. 443 (1971). After several weeks during which the defendant had been under
investigation for possible involvement in a recent murder, he was arrested at his home. The
police towed his car, which had been sitting in his driveway, to the station. Id. at 445-47. The
vehicle was searched three times: the first instance was two days after its seizure: second, one
year after its seizure; and again fnurteen months thereafter. Id. at 448. The Court refused to
find that the search was permissible under the "'Carroll-Chambers" theory,, noting that the
rationale behind the Carroll exception was the inherent mobility of the vehlicle. Id. at 459-62.
The exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of a motor vehicle that had been
stopped on the highway. In that situation, " 'the car is moveable, the occupants are alerted, and
• . . the opportunity to search is fleeting.' " 1d. at 460 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
at 51). The Court stated that the facts in Coolidge did not resemble these circumstances.
Coolidge was distinguishable in that, during their investigation, the police w'ere aware of the
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tomobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment

' 39
fades away and disappears.
Parallel to the development and application of the automobile

exception, a collateral issue involving its scope often arose: assumning
a warrantless search of an automobile was justifiable pursuant to the

Carroll-Chambers exception, did this authorization necessarily en40
compass the search of closed containers found within the vehicle?
United States c. Chadwick41 was the first United States Supreme
Court case which tangentially addressed this issue. In Chadwick,

-after arresting the defendant and towing his vehicle to the local federal building, narcotics agents conducted a warrantless search of a
footlocker that had been found in the trunk of the car. 42 The gov-

car's probable connection with the crime, and there was no indication that the defendant intended to flee. Moreover, the defendant had been consistently cooperative with the police and
had not taken advantage of the ample opportunity to destroy any incriminating evidence. 403
U.S. at 460. "The opportunity for search was thus hardly 'fleeting.' " Id. Since Carroll would
have failed to justify a warrantless search of the defendant's automobile carried out immediately
upon his arrest, Chambers could not be used to validate the later searches conducted by police
at the station. Id. at 463. Thus, the Court read Chambers as justifying searches which occur at
some place other than the location where the vehicle is first seized only when an immediate
search pursuant to Carroll would have been proper in the first instance. Id.
39 403 U.S. at 461-62.
40 See Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept: The Uiireasonableness of Being Reasonable, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 436, 456 (1978); 2 LAFAvE, supra note 24, at
535. Prior to the 1977 case of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), it seemed that a
majority of the circuit courts of appeals were answering the question in the affirmative. E.g.,
United States v. Vento, ,533 F.2d 838, 867 n.101 (3rd Cir. 1976) (warrantless search of paper
bag found in the defendant's vehicle); United States v. Tramnuti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104-05 (2d
Cir.), cert.denied. 423 U.S. 832 (1975) (warrantless search of suitcase removed from back seat of
suspect's automobile): United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (search of
containers found in automobile conducted contemporaneously with search of vehicle); United
States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), reaffirmed without published opinion
sub nora. United States v. Aviles, 535 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Garay,
477 F.2d 1306, 1308 (5th Cir. 1973) (exigencies of situation cannot validate warrantless search of
suitcases made when appellants were under restraint and therefore incapable of concealing or
destroying the suitcases or their contents).
41 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
42 Id. at 4-5. Federal narcotics agents in Boston had received information from Amtrak
Railroad officials concerning a footlocker arriving on a train from San Diego. Id. at 3. The
agents observed three suspects and a train station attendant lifting the footlocker into the trunk
of Chadwick's waiting car. Id. at 4. While the trunk of the car was still open, and before its
engine had been started, the agents moved in and arrested all three suspects. Id. They were
then removed, along with the car and footlocker, to the Boston Federal Building. Id. Approximately ninety minutes -after the arrest, the agents opened the double locked footlocker without
obtaining either the respondent's consent or a search warrant. Id. Contained therein was a large
amount of marijuana. Id. at 5.
In the district court, the government attempted to justify the agents' actions under the
automobile exception. United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D. Mass. 1975),
aff'd, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The lower court rejected this
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erminent attempted to formulate a "hvbrid" exception for luggage hy
extending the Carroll rationale to searches of easily moveable objects.43 The Court rejected this contention by finding that the traditional justifications for the automobile exception of mobility and diminished expectation of privacy were not applicable to luggage. 44 The
proper procedure in this instance would have been to seize the footlocker and secure it until a valid search warrant was acquired. 45 The
Court's refusal to so extend the Carroll rationale to these objects led
many lower courts to conclude that the automobile exception could
not justify the warrantless search of closed containers merely because
they had been located within a motor vehicle. 46 The resulting split

contention by determining that the relationship between the footlocker and the automobile was
purely coincidental. 1d. at 773. The court noted that the locker had not been transported in the
vehicle, the car trunk was never closed between the time the defendants had first placed the
footlocker in the automobile and when they were arrested bv federal agents, the car's engine
was not engaged and no one was sitting behind the wheel in the driver's seat. "Under these
circumstances, the floor of the automobile trunk was nothing more than a platform or resting
place for the footlocker." Id. at 772.
43 433 U.S. at 11-12. In both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, the government
abandoned the argument that the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception. Instead, it was asserted that the rationale which permitted warrantless searches of automobiles, that is, mobility, demonstrated the reasonableness of the warrantless search of luggage. Id.
IId. at 13. The Court commented that:
[l]uggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to border
entry or common carrier travel: nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and
official scrutinv on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In
sum, a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater
than in an automobile.
Id. The mobility aspect of the footlocker, once in the Boston Federal Building, was negligible, if
not non-existent. Id. "With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake
the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant." Id. Thus, the enigma of
whether an immediate search would constitute a "greater or lesser intrusion" on fourth amendment rights than the immobilization of an object until a warrant was obtained, which was left
unresolved in Chambers, was definitively answered in Chadwick. Id. at 13-14 n.8. See note 37
supra and accompanying text.
a" See 433 U.S. at 13-14 n.8.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). In Chadwick,
Justice Brennan concurred, noting that the more narrow issue of whether or not the automobile
exception could have justified the search of the footlocker remained unresolved. 433 U.S. at
16-17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
While the contents of the car could have been searched pursuant to the automobile
exception, it is by no means clear that the contents of locked containers found
inside a car are subject to search under this exception, any more than they would
be if the police found them in any other place.
Id. at 17 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of authority among the courts evidenced the fact that Chadwick had
by no means resolved the issue. 47
The Supreme Court ultimately confronted this dilemma in Arkansas v. Sanders.48 The suitcase which was subjected to a warrantless search in this case had experienced substantially more than a
"mere coincidental" contact with the vehicle from which it had
been
previously removed. 4 9 The Court recognized that the issue now before it required a determination of whether the warrantless search of
the suitcase was, according to the Chadwick rationale, violative of the
fourth amendment, or constitutional pursuant to the ChambersCarroll exception. 50

The dissenters, however, felt that had the issue been addressed, the answer would have
been clear. If the agents had delayed the arrest until the car had begun to drive away, the
search and seizure would hae been constitutional under the automobile exception. 1d. at 22-23
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). It was also noted that the exception to the warrant requirement
includes searches of locked automobile compartments, e.g., glove compartments and trunks. Id.
at 23 n.4 (Blackmnn, J., dissenting).
47 Two diametrically opposed positions were adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuit
Courts. In United States v. Stevie, it was found that an individual's expectation of privacy in the
contents of his luggage (established in Chadwick) is entitled to the protection of the fourth
amendment, regardless of whether the luggage was found within an automobile. 582 F.2d 1175,
1178-79 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
validity of a warrantless search of luggage removed from the appellant's car. United States v.
Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1977).
48 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
49 See id. at 755. In Sanders, the suitcase was placed in the trunk of the taxi, and the
vehicle traveled several blocks before being stopped bv the detectives. See notes 8-10 supra and
accompanying text.
The Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion, felt that the nexus between the suitcase and
the vehicle was only fortuitous, and that the automobile exception was not really involved in
this case. 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Instead of focusing upon the substantiality
of the contact that the suitcase had experienced with the taxi, he viewed as determinative the
fact that the police had specific probable cause to suspect that contraband was located in the
container itself, and not just somewhere in the vehicle. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). He
therefore concluded that the relationship between the automobile and the suitcase was purely
coincidental and, thus, did not justify invoking the automobile exception. Id. (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). For a discussion of the concurring opinion, see note 63 infra and accompanying
text.
50 442 U.S. at 757. Although unconfirmed until the Sanders decision, it was arguable that
Chadwcick prohibited any warrantless search of luggage, regardless of its location immediately
preceding the search. See notes 46 & 47 supra and accompanying text. Follhwing the Chambers
line of reasoning, however, it seemed that the contents of containers found in automobiles
should be just as accessible to warrantless searches as the contents of the vehicle itself. Since, as
the Chadwiick dissenters had noted, Chambers authorized the search of an autolnobile's locked
compartmenuts, 433 U.S. at 23, n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), there appeared to be no reason
for treating containers found within those areas of the car under a different fourth amendment
standard. No distinction in terms of mobility or expectation of privacy between the locked
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority of the Court, conceded
that the first requirement of the Carroll formula, that is, probable cause
to believe the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime,
was fully satisfied in this instance.51 The Court found that the officers, by seizing the suitcase and bringing it within their exclusive control, had rendered it immobile, thereby dissipating the exigency of
the situation. 5 2 The Court noted that the exigency of mobility associated with a particular object cannot be measured or affected by
the place from which it was seized.53 The fact that a suitcase had
been traveling in any type of vehicle immediately preceding its seizure was now reduced to an irrelevancy in the context of fourth
amendment analysis..4

The Court additionally found that the second prong of the
rationale justifying the automobile exception, namely, the reduced expectation of privacy surrounding a vehicle, could not be applied to
personal luggage despite the fact that the luggage had been taken
from a car stopped on the highway. 55 The very purpose of luggage is
to serve as a repository of an individual's personal belongings. Accordingly, a person's expectation in maintaining the privacy of those items
will not be dissipated merely because he intends to travel with such
luggage in an automobile. 56

portions of automobiles and luggage found therein was apparent. 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmrun, J.,
dissenting). After the police seize an automobile, both its trunk and any suitcases contained
therein can be adequately protected until a warrant is obtained. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 24, at
540-41. Additionally, any distinction between the trunk of the vehicle and suitcases as repositories for personal effects is difficult to comprehend. Viewed in this respect, the expectation
of privacy in the locked compartments of the vehicle should not be diminished as is the case
with the other portions of the automobile. Id.
51 442 U.S. at 761. See notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
52 442 U.S. at 761.
- "[Tlhere was not the slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained.' " id.
53 Id. at 763.
11 See id. at 763-66. The Court was careful to note, however, the possible existence of
"'special exigencies." other than the location of an object immediately prior to its search, which
would independently justify a warrantless search, Id. at 763 n. 11. See, e.g., United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977) (dicta) (probable cause to believe suitcase contains inmediately dangerous instrumentality justifies search without warrant).
Additionally, if a suitcase was in the immediate control of an arrestee, its warrantless search
might be justified as incident to a lawful arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218.
236 (1973). But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 (warrantless search of luggage
seized at time of arrest invalid where no exigency exists).
The State, in the instant case, however, did not argue or attempt to justify the search of
respondent's suitcase as incidental to his arrest. 442 U.S, at 764 n. 11. The Court, therefiore, did
not consider the constitutionality of that occurrence. Id.
55 442 U.S. at 764.
56 1i
It was noted that "one is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions in a
suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported
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The State, citing Chambers, maintained that since the seizure
and immobilization of the suitcase was cognizable under the fourth
amendment, an immediate search would have been no more constitutionally offensive. 5 7 By way of a footnote, the Court refused to determine which of these two methods was more intrusive upon an individual's fourth amendment rights. 58 Instead, the Court focused on
the disparity between the inconvenience which would be caused to
police departments by requiring the seizure and indefinite retention
of automobiles until a warrant could be obtained, and requiring the
same procedure for luggage. 59 Since the burdens attendant to the
seizure and impoundment of luggage were substantially less, it was
held that the police could not justify the more intrusive action of
conducting a luggage search without a warrant. 60 The Court therefore concluded that the police, in searching Sander's suitcase, had
overstepped the bounds of their authority and acted unconstitutionally. 61 Carroll, and the litany of cases following it, would not serve
to support the warrantless search of a suitcase "merely because it was
6 2
located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police."
by other means or temporarily checked or stored." Id. The Court was merely reiterating the
Chadwick rationale. There, the Court determined that luggage does not possess the qualities
which serve to decrease the expectation of privacy surrounding motor vehicles. 433 U.S. at 13.
See note 44 supra.
57 442 U.S. at 765 n.14.
58 Id. The Court in Chadwick found a search to be a far greater intrusion than a seizure.
433 U.S. at 13-14 n.8.
59 442 U.S. at 765-66 n.14. Requiring the seizure and immobilization of vehicles
would have imposed a constitutional requirement upon police departments of all
sizes around the country to have available the people and equipment necessarv to
Moreover, once
transport impounded automobiles to some central location.
seized automobiles were taken from the highway the police would be responsible
for providing some appropriate location where they could be kept, with due regard
to the safety of the vehicles and their contents, until a magistrate ruled on the
application for a warrant.
Id.
60 1d. at 766. Impliedly, the seizure and retention of the suitcase was, by fourth amendment
standards, a less objectionable invasion into the individual's rights. Id. For those persons who
would be more greatly offended by the delay and inconvenience of having their personal belongings indefinitely impounded, the Court found that consent to an immediate search was
always available. Id. at 764 n.12. However, as Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring
opinion, some people, although not involved in any illegal activity, might not desire to have the
contents of their luggage exposed publicly. Id. at 767. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
61 Id. at 766.
62 Id. at 765-66. The Court was careful to limit its holding to personal luggage. Id. at 766.
The "full protection of the Fourth Amendment" which had just been accorded to suitcases.
might not be equally available to other types of containers, id. at 764-65 n.13, especially those
which "by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance." Id. As examples, the Court proffered
"a kit of burglar tools or a gun case." Id.
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Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Stevens in a concurring
opinion, agreed with the majority's finding that the location of a piece
of luggage immediately prior to its search has absolutely no bearing
upon the expectation of privacy which surrounds it. 63 He refused to
find, however, that the circumstances of this case involved the application of the automobile exception. 64 The Chief Justice reasoned
that the police, pursuant to the information they had received, had
probable cause to believe that the green suitcase contained contraband, they did not possess a more vague and generalized belief

65
that an illegal substance could he located anywhere in the vehicle.
The fact that the suitcase was placed into the trunk of an automobile
was viewed as a fortuitous circunstance making the relationship between the vehicle and the luggage purely coincidental. 6 6 The Chief
Justice maintained, therefore, that like Chadwick, the instant case
failed to answer the question of whether the warrantless search of
containers found in automobiles, validly stopped by police on a high6 7
way or street, was cognizable under the automobile exception.
Had the factual circumstances permitted the assertion of the exception, it was questionable whether such an extension would be appro68
priate.

63 Id. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice noted that the Court was merely
affirming the proposition, first recognized in Chadwick, that individuals enjoy a "legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of a trunk or suitcase . . . [which] is not diminished
simply because the owner's arrest occurs in a public place." Id. at 766-67 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64 Id. at 766. See note 49 supra.
65 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The original circumstances, providing the
officers with probable cause to believe that the suitcase alone was the locus of the contraband,
could not be altered by the fact that it was ultimately removed from an automobile. Id.
66 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). In order to determine the applicability of the automobile
exception, the district court in Chadwick focused on the length and quality of the contact which
the container had with the automobile as distinguished from the quantum of probable cause
possessed by the police. United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 772 (D. Mass. 1975),
aff'd, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). For a discussion of that analysis,
see note 42 supra.
67 442 U.S. at 767-68 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The automobile exception could be properly invoked only when the police had probable cause to believe that the vehicle, and not
receptacles therein, contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). Since those circumstances were not present in this case, it was not appropriate to decide
the issue. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
68 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice stated:
I am not sure whether . . . [the existence of probable cause to believe contraband
was located somewhere in the vehicle] would . . . [present] a stronger or weaker
case for requiring a warrant to search the suitcase when a warrantless search of the
automobile is otherwise permissible.
Id. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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As in Chadwick, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented
Finding that luggage transported in an
from the majority opinion."
automobile is as mobile as the vehicle itself and not deserving of any
greater expectation of privacy than a locked glove compartment or
trunk, the dissent maintained that these containers should be equally
amenable to a warrantless search. 70 By arbitrarily drawing the line
of permissible warrantless searches between those directed only at
the vehicle itself and those which focused on containers found
therein, the dissent concluded that the Court had engaged in nothing
more than a mere exercise in futility, elevating form over substance,
with the possible result of placing law enforcement officials operating
in the field in very precarious positions. 71 Lastly, the dissent was
critical of the fact that the Court had limited its decision to personal
luggage, thereby leaving unresolved the question of which types of
containers must be accorded the full scope of fourth amendment protections. 72 To eliminate the confusion and uncertainty which had
been generated by this area of criminal procedure, and which was
only exacerbated by the Sanders decision, the dissent suggested the
adoption of a clear cut rule which would permit the warrantless
search and seizure of any type of personal property found in an automobile. 73
The Supreme Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity
to definitively answer the "debatable question" which had been posed
almost a decade earlier in Chambers.742 There, the Court left unresolved the question of whether an immediate warrantless search of an
object was more of an encroachment on fourth amendment rights
69

Id. at 768 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). For a brief discussion of the dissenting opinion in

Chadwvick, see note 46 supra.
70

442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).

71

Id.

at 770-71 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). BY way of illustration, the dissent noted that a

police officer approaching a properly stopped automobile would have to evaluate a multiplicity
of circumstaces, Id. at 771 (Blackiun, J.,dissenting). For example, if probable cause to arrest
the occupants exists, then the officer could search any objects which were within the arrestee's
immediate control Id. But see note 54 supra. If there is probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crine, the officer can search the entire interior as

well as the locked compartments; however, under Chadiwick and Sanders, any "suitcase-like
object" found in the car but outside the immediate control area of the occupants cannot be
searched without a warrant. 442 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, if the officer

has probable cause to arrest persons in the front seat of the car, is a suitcase located on the back
seat within the area of immediate control, thus avoiding the Chadiick-Sanders rule? Id.
dissenting).
(Blackinun, J,,
442 U.S. at 768,

77

2 (Blackinun, I., dissenting). See note 52 supra. "Stillhanging in
limbo and probably soon to be litigated are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper
bag, and any other kind of container." 442 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72

73 442 U.S. at 772 (Blackmnis J.,dissenting).
74 See notes 36 & 37 and 57 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
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than the seizure and retention of the item until a warrant was procured. 75 In Sanders, instead of analyzing which of these procedures
would be more offensive to the individual's constitutional rights, the
Court focused on the burdens which the police would have to endure
should they be required to impound and hold all automobiles pending the issuance of a warrant. 76 Therefore, it is still unclear whether
the immediate search of a container found within an automobile is
more of an abhorrent interference with individual rights and liberties
than would be its warrantless seizure and impoundment. What is
clear, however, is that the warrantless seizure and detention of personal luggage is the required course of action because the police, not
the individual, would be minimally inconvenienced thereby. 77
Additionally , as the dissent pointed out, the Court failed to
adequately distinguish, in terms of privacy interest, between personal
luggage and an " 'integral part of the automobile;' "78 that is, the trunk.
glove compartment, concealed areas under the dashboard, and behind the upholstering of the seats. 7 9 The unanswered question that
arises is why should these sections of an automobile be accorded a
lesser expectation of privacy than luggage or other containers that are
found within them? 80 Unlike the rest of the vehicle, these areas are
not in plain view, nor is their inspection necessary to ensure the safe
operation of the automobile. 81 The additional fact that a validly, impounded automobile and its integral parts are no more mobile than
any other type of personalty makes the application of varying fourth
amendment standards questionable.
The most troubling aspect of the Sanders decision is the recognition that different types of containers, depending upon their nature,
will be accorded inconsistent levels of fourth amendment protection. 82 Distinctions will have to be drawn between various types of
See
76 442
77 442
78 442
'-

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51-52.
U.S. at 765-66 1.14. For a description of these burdens, see note 59 supra.
U.S. at 766. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
U.S. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 442 U.S. at 763). For a discussion of

the dissenting opinion, see notes 69-73 supra and accompanNing text.

79 442 U.S. at 763.
80 As Justice Marshall has noted:
[ilt
would be wholly unrealistic to say that there is no reasonable and actual expectation in maintaining the privacy of closed compartments of abi] . . . automobile.
when it is customary for people in this day to carry their most personal and private
papers and effects in their automobiles from time to time.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 388 n.6 (1976) (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
81 See id. at 386-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). These are reasons which have traditionally
explained, at least in part, why an automobile does not enjoy as complete an expectation of
privacy as do some other instrumentalities.
82 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text.
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containers that could be encountered in the context of an automobile

search. Al immediate search may be the appropriate procedure ill
one case, while a seizure and immobilization of the container will be
required in another. The determinative factor will, in most cases, be
a judge's subjective opinion that a certain type of container call support a reasonable expectation of privacy.

83

Reliance upon such a

tenuous and discretionary standard, renders the law of search and
seizure more susceptible to inconsistent and irreconcilable results.
Although the Court intended to alleviate much of the turmoil
and confusion engendered by the Chadwick decision, it only sueceeded in creating a deeper abyss of uncertainty. While the scope of
the automobile exception has been severely narrowed with respect to
personal luggage, its boundaries may yet expand or contract in certain
situations depending upon the type of container involved. In our society, the automobile has become an instrumentality which touches

and affects almost every person ol a day-to-day basis. As such, rules
which dictate the extent to which law enforcement officials can intrude upon an individual's possessory and privacy interests in their
vehicles should be unambiguous and uniform. The result in Sanders,

therefore, should have been either to authorize the warrantless search
of an\v personal property found in an automobile pursuant to the
Carroll-Chambers exception, or to eliminate the vacuous distinction
between personal luggage and the locked compartments of motor vehicles by requiring a warrant for the search of both.

Lawrence H. Jacobs
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See, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 125 (10th Cir. 1979) (treating briefcase

found on airplane like an item of personal luggage, court found greater expectation of privacy in
its contents, than in contents of plane generally): United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253, 255
(10th Cir. 1979) (invalidating search of a closed backpack lawfully seized in searching defendant's
automobile). In Meier, the court noted that "[a] backpack would seem to be governed by the
suitcase rule, as a backpack, like a suitcase, is a 'repository for personal items when one wishes
to transport them.' " Id. Cf. United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1978)
(upholding warrantless search of department store box found in automobile). The court was of
the opinion that "It]here is simply an insufficient expectation of privacy in an unsecured
cardboard box sitting in plain view in the passenger compartment of an automobile." Id.

